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A New Progressivism
Cass R. Sunstein*

Abstract
Based on an address for a conference on Law and Transformation in South Africa, this paper
explores problems with two twentieth-century approaches to government: the way of markets and the
way of planning. It urge that the New Progressivism simultaneously offers (1) a distinctive conception
of government’s appropriate means, an outgrowth of the late-twentieth-century critique of economic
planning, and (2) a distinctive understanding of government’s appropriate ends, an outgrowth of
evident failures with market arrangements and largely a product of the mid-twentieth-century critique
of laissez faire. It emphasizes the need to replace bans and commands with appropriate incentives, and
to attend to social norms and social meanings in leading human behavior in welfare-promoting
directions. The ultimate goal is to promote some of the goals associated with America’s New Deal and
Europe’s social democracy, but without using the crude, inflexible, and often counterproductive
methods associated with those approaches. Some attention is devoted to the effects of globalization, the
AIDS crisis, crime prevention, and the role of economic growth.

Introduction: Means and Ends

The German psychologist Dietrich Dorner has done some fascinating experiments
designed to see whether people can engage in successful social engineering.1 Dorner’s
experiments are run via computer. Participants are asked to solve problems faced by
the inhabitants of some region of the world; the problems may involve poverty, poor
medical care, inadequate fertilization of crops, sick cattle, insufficient water, or
excessive hunting and fishing. Through the magic of the computer, many policy
initiatives are available (improved care of cattle, childhood immunization, drilling
more wells), and participants can choose among them. Once particular initiatives are
chosen, the computer projects, over short periods and then over decades, what is
likely to happen in the region.
In these experiments, success is entirely possible; some initiatives will actually
make for effective and enduring improvements. But most of the participants—even
the most educated and professional ones—produce calamities. They do so because

*
This paper is based on a keynote address on a conference on Law and Transformation in South
Africa; readers are asked to make allowances for a paper originally intended for oral presentation. I am
grateful to Lesley Wexler for superb research assistance and to Martha Nussbaum and Theunis Roux
for many helpful comments and discussions.
1
Dietrich Dorner, The Logic of Failure (1997).
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they do not see the complex, system-wide effects of particular interventions. For
example, they may see the importance of increasing the number of cattle, but once
they do that, they create a serious risk of overgrazing, and they fail to anticipate that
problem. They may understand full well the value of drilling more wells to provide
water, but they do not anticipate the energy and environmental effects of the drilling,
which then endangers the food supply. Only the rare participant is able to see a
number of steps down the road—to understand the multiple effects of one-shot
interventions into the system.

NOT A MIDPOINT

Since the 1980s, many nations have been concerned to make three transitions. The
first involves the shift from an authoritarian system to some kind of democracy. The
second involves the creation of a secure system of individual rights. The third
involves the introduction of reforms that will promote economic growth.

The

relationships among the three transitions are complex and contested. Are rights
necessary for democratic self-government, or antithetical to it? Might democracy
undermine economic growth, at least if people are demanding measures that will
make prosperity less likely? Will a stable system of rights weaken, or strengthen, the
prospects for economic development?
My goal in this essay is to elaborate an understanding of government’s role
that promises, at once, to strengthen individual rights, to promote democratic self-rule,
and to increase economic growth. With some trepidation, I will use describe this
understanding as a New Progressivism. New Progressivists attempt to combine an
appreciation of a great lesson of the first half of the twentieth century, the failure of
markets, with an appreciation of the great lesson of the second half of the twentieth
century, the failure of planning. New Progressivists offer a certain conception of both
rights and democracy. They understand rights to include freedom from desperate
conditions; they understand democracy to require a certain measure of deliberation
and reflection, rather than automatic responses to what the public currently wants.
Because freedom from desperate conditions is a right, they are concerned that total
reliance on is connected with a failure to protect individual rights. They also think that
a deliberative democracy will supplement markets, and hence that a system of market
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ordering alone does not allow a proper domain for democratic self-rule. The failure of
planning is simultaneously a failure in terms of economics, democracy, and rights.
I urge that the New Progressivism simultaneously offers (1) a distinctive
conception of government’s appropriate means, an outgrowth of the late-twentiethcentury critique of economic planning, and (2) a distinctive understanding of
government’s appropriate ends, an outgrowth of evident failures with market
arrangements and largely a product of the mid-twentieth-century critique of laissez
faire. For this reason the New Progressivism should not be seen as a compromise
between right and left, or as an effort to seek some midpoint between those who
believe in markets and those who reject them. Far from being a compromise or a
midpoint, the New Progressivism offers both means and ends of its own.
With respect to means, the New Progressivism rejects approaches prominently
associated with both social democracy and the New Deal, on the ground that they are
frequently ineffective or even counterproductive, especially from the economic point
of view. To the New Progressivists, social democrats are too often like participants in
Dorner’s experiments, compromising economic and other goals without much sense
of what they are doing. Those who endorse the New Progressivism are insistently
focused on consequences, and they know that initiatives designed to help people who
need help might backfire in practice—and that good intentions are no excuse for bad
consequences. Above all, those who endorse the New Progressivism have learned
from the past fifty years of experience with markets and with efforts to discipline and
constrain markets. They are alert to side effects and unintended harmful
consequences. Wherever possible, they attempt to use market-oriented strategies,
enlisting markets on behalf of human interests—not because those strategies are
morally superior, and not because markets have special moral claims (they do not),
but because such strategies are likely to work. New Progressivists believe that if
economic growth is a goal, markets should be enlisted far more often than they now
are.
It follows that New Progressivists are alert to the central role of civil society,
and especially to the importance of social norms, which often drive private behaviour
and which can change, for better or worse, over time. They are also skeptical, on both
economic and democratic grounds, of command-and-control regulation and of
aggressive interference with the labour market. They want to supplement markets, not
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to displace them. They favour such initiatives as the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) and housing subsidies for the poor, and they are cautious about a high
minimum wage and rent control legislation. They believe that environmental
problems should be handled through economic incentives, not through centralized
mandates, which invite protectionism and interest-group maneuvering. Thus, for
example, the New Progressivism
•

attempts to control problems associated with social norms, such as crime, unsafe
sex, and other risk-taking behavior, through democratic efforts at norm
management, often involving public-private partnerships;

•

places the highest possible premium on education and training;

•

rejects economic protectionism;

•

favors incentives rather than centralized governmental commands;

•

attempts to ensure flexibility in the labour market if and on the ground that it helps
low-income workers as well as others;

•

sees economic growth as a central (though far from exclusive) part of antipoverty
policy.
So much for means—what of ends? Those who endorse the New

Progressivism seek initially to achieve an incompletely theorized agreement2—an
agreement on various practices and initiatives capable of attracting support from a
wide range of theoretical perspectives. Utilitarians, Kantians, those who begin from
diverse theological positions, and numerous others can support the approach urged
here. But to the extent that theoretical depth is required, New Progressivists will insist
that markets should be identified with neither justice nor liberty. They do not think
that markets will inevitably protect individual rights, especially because they believe
that the right to be free from discrimination counts as a right, one that markets can
promote. They see markets as operating against a background that includes
considerable injustice, and also limited liberty. They think that to a large degree,
market ordering will merely build on that unacceptable background.
At the same time, New Progressivists have considerable sympathy for some of
the rights emphasized by social democrats in Europe and New Dealers in the United
States: decent life prospects for all, a social safety net, a safe environment, genuine
equality of opportunity. But they believe that these rights have often been quite murky
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and ill defined—and also that they have been confused, too often, with a kind of
freestanding egalitarianism, concerned to ensure equal economic outcomes as such.
Those who believe in a New Progressivism insist on an acceptable floor for everyone.
But they are not much concerned with large disparities in wealth, not because these
are fair, but because the much more important goal is to ensure decent outcomes for
all, and because allowing such disparities may well be necessary to provide
appropriate incentives.
To those who believe in a New Progressivism, what is most necessary is to
ensure that basic human capabilities do not fall below a certain, reasonably generous
threshold.3 To this New Progressivists add a distinctive conception of equality, one
that forbids second-class citizenship, or lower caste status, for members of any group.
This anticaste principle makes sex equality a singularly high priority, as a means for
economic development and an end in itself. The rights embodied in the anticaste
principle are indispensable to growth. They promote democracy as well. For these
reasons, the New Progressivists hope to offer a conception of government that
simultaneously promote democratic and economic goals, and that does so without
compromising individual rights, properly conceived. Of course these various ideas
can be specified in ways that will lead to intense conflicts among them. New
Progressivists attempt a specification that will reduce the conflicts, seeing rights, for
example, as a precondition for democracy and growth, and seeing growth as an
(imperfect) ally of rights.

OF MESS AND MENACE

There has of course been a great deal of recent discussion, both supportive and
critical, of what a ‘Third Way’ might involve. What I am calling the New
Progressivism has an obvious relationship to the idea of a Third Way, especially
insofar as those who endorse Third Way thinking tend to be receptive to markets and
growth at the same time that they are committed to improving the rights of
disadvantaged people. I do not intend here to summarize that discussion, or to endorse

2

See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996).
See Amartya Sen, Development As Freedom (1999); Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human
Development (1999); Anthony Giddens, The Third Way and its Critics (2000).
3
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the Third Way programme.4 What I mean to do instead is to develop a freestanding
account of what a New Progressivism might be understood to entail.
The American law professor Karl Llewellyn is said to have said, ‘Technique
without morals is a menace; but morals without technique is a mess.’ This is a fitting
criticism of some of the experiments in social democracy of the last several decades;
it is a shorthand description of the failures of many participants in Dorner’s
experiments, failures with parallels in the economic and democratic disasters brought
about by twentieth-century ‘planners’ of various stripes. But Llewellyn is also said to
have said: ‘Morals without technique is a mess; but technique without morals is a
menace.’ This is a fitting criticism of many twentieth-century experiments in social
engineering, but it is a criticism too of excessive reliance on free markets. The real
task, for those interested in a New Progressivism, involves development of
approaches and methods that are neither menace nor mess.
Recent debates, including debates over the Third Way, have drawn attention to
two possible strategies for dealing with markets: to leave them alone or to displace
them. But the dichotomy is much too simple; in fact it is damagingly simple. It is too
simple, first, because the idea of ‘displacing’ markets conceals a range of options,
from nationalizing industries, to blocking certain deals, to limiting waivers, to
providing information. It is too simple, second, because it is possible to complement
rather than to displace markets—to provide institutions that do what markets do not
do, and to help people who are failed by markets, an emphatically human institution.
As Amartya Sen has written, very much in the spirit of the New Progressivism, ‘it is
possible to argue at the same time both (1) for more market institutions, and (2) for
going more beyond the market.’5
With respect to methods and strategies, that is what I will be suggesting here.
Throughout I will paint with an extremely broad brush, discussing many issues that
could easily be treated in a short book, or even a long one. My hope is that the brisk
and sometimes reckless treatment of many issues might make up for its otherwise
unpardonable neglect of the trees, by providing a decent perspective on the forest, a
4

Two prominent discussions are Anthony Giddens, The Third Way (1998), and Giddens, ibid. In my
view, Giddens offers too large a collection of ideas, a pastiche in fact, and too much of his discussion is
platitudinous. Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze, India (1997), does not bill itself in these terms, but it
seems to me the best presentation of what a New Progressivism might actually look like. Cass R.
Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice (1997), is also intended to set out ideas in this direction.
5
Sen and Dreze, ibid. at 28.
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perspective that perhaps continues to be absent from existing treatments of possible
twenty-first century ‘ways’.
The plan of the essay is as follows. The second part offers a brief discussion of
two familiar ‘ways’ and of what is wrong with them. Here globalization is seen to be a
process that intensifies problems with both markets and planning, in a way that
jeopardizes economic growth and also certain individual rights. The third part deals
with social norms, especially in the context of crime prevention, HIV/AIDS, and
related problems. The fourth part deals with employment policy and poverty. The
fifth part explores command-and-control regulation and some alternatives, especially
in the context of environmental protection. The sixth part investigates the importance
and limits of economic growth, with particular stress on the need to attend to human
capabilities and sex equality. The seventh part is a brief conclusion.

Two ‘Ways’—and Globalization

THE WAY OF MARKETS AND THE WAY OF PLANNING

If there is a New Progressivism, what is it opposing? There are two candidates. Let us
understand the first to be a version of the Reagan-Thatcher programme, routed above
all in the work of Nobel Prize winner Friedrich Hayek. Call this ‘the way of markets’.
On this view, free markets are indispensable to liberty, rights, and economic
growth. The role of the state is to create the preconditions for well-functioning
markets, by establishing rights of private property and freedom of contract, by
ensuring competition rather than monopoly, and by preventing force and fraud.
Perhaps the government should also provide a social safety net, though a relatively
weak one (to ensure proper work incentives). But according to those who endorse the
way of markets, government should not interfere with the labour market through, for
example, high minimum wage requirements or through special protections for labour
unions. And those who endorse the way of markets place the highest possible
premium on economic growth, on a particular, market-based conception of liberty,
and on social ordering through market ordering, which they see as essential to growth
and liberty alike. Of course there is a spectrum of possible approaches here, from
those who reject a social safety net to those willing to accept an ample set of
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protections for those at the bottom. What I mean to emphasize, sometimes captured in
the idea of ‘neo-liberalism’, or ‘liberalization’, is the idea of placing primary
emphasis on free markets and economic productivity.
Like the way of markets, the way of planning is actually a spectrum of ‘ways’,
ranging from Soviet-style centralized planning to those forms of social democracy
(not excluding America’s) that are comfortable, in some areas, with nationalized
industries, aggressive regulation of markets, price and wage controls, and most
generally ‘planning’ of various kinds. As random examples, consider the following:
•

laws that make it difficult for employers to discharge employees;

•

laws that make it hard for landlords to evict tenants;

•

environmental regulation that specifies the technology that must be used by
industry;

•

high minimum wage requirements;

•

tariffs;

•

public ownership of industry;

•

ceilings and floors on prices as a whole.
Of course it is possible for a nation to adopt narrow or broad plans, or to be a

planner in only a few small domains. A government that is generally skeptical of
planning might conclude, for example, that it makes sense to have tariffs in some
areas, or that agriculture should be protected with price supports, or that workers
should be protected from discharge, or that technological requirements are properly
placed on new cars, to reduce levels of air pollution.

PROBLEMS AND STRESSES

Let us now briefly explore some of the problems in both of these ‘ways’. For those
who seek the way of markets, the initial difficulty is that markets should not be
identified with liberty or with rights properly conceived. Markets operate against the
backdrop set by existing distributions of resources, opportunities, and talents. When
an employee is able to attract only a small amount of money for an hour’s work, it is
surely wrong to say that liberty is respected if we simply respect the deal. To the
extent that existing distributions are a product of a lack of liberty, market ordering is a
problem, not the solution. Whether the deal should be disrupted is another question.
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But what markets generate does not come, from the standpoint of liberty, with a stamp
of approval.
An equally fundamental problem is that the consequences of market ordering
may not be so wonderful for many people, who will be left with bad opportunities and
few resources. It should not be necessary to belabour this point. In any large nation,
respect for market ordering will predictably produce a situation in which millions of
people end up with low wages, long hours, and bad working conditions—if they end
up with work at all. Of course a social safety net can help. But even if it is generous, it
is not going to do all of what must be done. It will not, for example, protect people
against unsafe working conditions, sexual harassment, pollution, or unfair
discrimination. To the extent that the category of rights includes protection against
some or all of these injuries, markets will compromise rights. Indeed we have every
reason to believe that in some circumstances, markets will promote discrimination—
as, for example, when customers or coworkers would prefer someone of a certain race
or gender.
At the same time, democratic values are compromised by any effort to treat
“the market” as sacrosanct. Put to one side the evident point that markets must be
created by government, willing and able to protect private property and freedom of
contract. A real problem is that a democratic citizenry will often want to supplement
or displace markets, simply to protect the interests of some, many, or all. A
commitment to market ordering will sharply diminish the terrain by which people
make choices about the kind of society in which they will live.
But planning faces difficulties of its own. One problem is that it is exceedingly
likely to be vulnerable to pressures from self-interested private groups with stakes in a
particular outcome. If so, democracy is jeopardized. It is very common, for example,
to observe environmental regulation being turned into a mechanism for the
distribution of benefits to groups whose interests have precious little to do with
environmental protection.6 An even more fundamental problem has to do with the
unintended bad consequences of the most well-motivated plans. ‘Planners’ are
constantly surprised. To take just two examples, a law that makes it hard for
employers to discharge employees is likely to make employers reluctant to hire people

6
In the United States, a classic discussion is Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty
Air (1983).
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in the first instance; a high minimum wage is likely to decrease employment. The
problem is pervasive, and it can lead to unfortunate consequences, especially for the
disadvantaged. We can understand the problem a bit better in light of Dorner’s work,
showing the unfortunate systemic effects of one-shot interventions. Economic and
social orders are systems, and the difficulty with plans is that their architects are
infrequently able to foresee the consequences of their actions.
Planners frequently refer to the unfairness of markets, and they are often right
to do so. But a reference to unfairness should not be allowed to support laws that
actually do no good. In Sen’s words, “The rhetoric of ‘equity’ has often been invoked
to justify governmental interventions without any scrutinized political assessment of
how these powers will be exercised and what actual effects they will have. In practice,
these ill-directed regulations have not only interfered often enough with the efficiency
of economic operations (especially of modern industries), they have also failed fairly
comprehensively to promote any kind of real equity in distributional matters.”7 The
point does not show that all plans are bad. But an overriding problem with the way of
planning is simply that the consequences of plans are often bad from the perspective
of well-meaning planners themselves. Plans may well violate rights, as has often been
seen in Communist nations. But plans are often ineffectual too, and the result can be
economic disaster. A low GDP is no ally of individual rights, especially if we
understand poverty as a rights violation.

THE ROLE OF GLOBALIZATION

Thus far I have said nothing about globalization. (By the term I mean to refer, very
simply, to the increasing mobility of persons, information, and products from one area
of the globe to another.) What is the effect of globalization on the way of planning
and the way of markets?
The most important point is that with respect to markets and planning, global
pressures produce a difference not of kind but of degree. We best think of a situation
of globalization as ‘like ordinary domestic markets—only more so’. The major effect
of global pressures is to intensify competition, so that stringent national regulation
might well leave companies within the nation at a disadvantage both abroad and at
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home. The resulting disadvantage might be reduced through protectionist measures,
but these create familiar problems of their own, because they hurt local consumers (by
increasing prices) and are likely, generally speaking, to harm the national economy.
In fact globalization increases the problems associated with both of the two
‘ways’. Insofar as markets produce rights violations of certain kinds, and bad results
for millions of people, global pressures increase the difficulty. (Of course such
markets also carry many benefits as well, for poor people as well as everyone else,
especially insofar as the consequence is to cut prices.) If workers within the nation
have to compete with everyone in the world, or in any case with a larger class of
people, those without training and skills are going to be left further behind. At the
same time, global pressures will inevitably confound ill-considered ‘plans’. Because
markets are frequently global, the effects of plans will often be very different from
what was sought and anticipated. This is a particular problem if, for example, an
effect of stringent regulation of the labor market is to reduce the demand for domestic
labour, thus hurting workers themselves.
This is hardly a claim that states are incapable of governing in a global era.
There is a great deal that they can do. Evidence simply does not support the claim that
the increased mobility of capital has disabled national regulation. But it is a claim that
the problems with the two ways are simultaneously compounded by the existence of
global markets.

THE ROLE OF COSTS: THE INEVITABLY CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
RIGHTS AND MONEY

Those who favour markets and those who favour planning often make a sharp
distinction between ‘negative rights’ and ‘positive rights’. The former are said to be
barriers to government action, and to that extent costless. The second are said to be
entitlements to government protection, and to that extent costly. Market enthusiasts
argue for the former and against the latter. Planners tend to argue for both.

7
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From the standpoint of the New Progressivism (as well as from the standpoint
of the Constitutional Court of South Africa8), both views suffer from a problem that is
both conceptual and practical: along the relevant dimension, there is no difference
between negative and positive rights. Both consist of entitlements to government
action, and to that extent, both are costly. In a poor nation, both sorts of rights are at
risk. Compare, for example, the right to free speech with the right to a minimum
income. In a state of effective anarchy, or in a state without funds, neither right can
exist. Of course the minimum income guarantee will lack taxpayer support. But the
same is true for the right to free speech. Without a judiciary willing to protect people
from public (as well as private) intrusions on freedom of speech, that freedom cannot
exist. Without a state willing and able to prevent public marauders from silencing
opposition, free speech is a chimera. Without public protection against private acts of
violence against controversial statements, free speech is plainly absent.
What is true for free speech is true for the whole universe of negative rights.9
Consider, for example, two of the most quintessential liberal rights: the right to
private property and the right to freedom of contract. Both of these depend not
incidentally but essentially on government protection. Private property does not exist
in the state of nature. It is a taxpayer-subsidized right, justified on the ground that it
benefits individuals and society as a whole. People can make contracts without a
strong state; but unless a legal system, subsidized by taxpayers, stands ready and able
to ensure that contracts are enforced, what force are mere words likely to have?
Those who believe in a New Progressivism know that all rights are costly and
that a poor state cannot protect rights. One of the reasons why they favour a strong
economy, and economic growth, is that these are important preconditions for ample
rights protection. And in a rich or poor state, it follows that a central task for
democratic self-government is to obtain the necessary funds and to ensure that they
are allocated in a way that reflects sensible priority setting. The field of public finance
is not separable from the field of democratic theory.

8

See Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: in re Certification of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) S.A. 744 (CC) para 77.
9
For detailed discussion, see Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights (1998).
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Social Meaning and Social Norms (with Particular Reference to HIV/AIDS,
Crime, Discrimination, and Environmental Protection)

Those who endorse the way of markets have little to say about the relationship
between government and civil society. Civil society is defined as equivalent to
economic society. Thus market enthusiasts tend to rely on existing norms and
preferences; this is part of their conception of laissez faire. Those who endorse the
way of planning also have little to say about civil society, sometimes treating it as a
domain that must be enlisted in the interest of social goals. But there is a better
approach, one that promises to do what governments often seek to do, but at lower
cost. Such an approach would emphasize several points: (1) the crucial importance of
social norms in producing both desirable and undesirable behaviour; (2) the inevitable
role of government in helping to constitute such norms; (3) the dependence of social
norms on current information; (4) the often-rapid change in social norms over time;
(5) the extent to which highly visible, or cognitively ‘available,’ examples and events
can alter norms and behaviour; and (5) the possible use of government power to move
norms in desirable directions.
As we will see, these points help suggest such promising possibilities for
controlling many social problems, including crime, HIV/AIDS, discrimination, and
environmental protection. What I will be emphasizing here is the significance of
social cascades, including norm cascades, in which social interactions can lead
behaviour in dramatic directions. Sometimes such cascades are induced by new
beliefs; sometimes they are induced by new understandings of the meaning of certain
actions. Since people take their cues from the actions of others, and since they care
about their reputations, certain policies can backfire, and certain others can have large
and desirable effects.
PROBLEMS WITH BANS, ECONOMIC AND OTHERWISE

When government seeks to discourage certain conduct, what should it do? Those
committed to planning generally have a simple answer: Forbid it. Those committed to
markets provide the same answer, though they are reluctant to ask government to
discourage private behaviour falling outside the basic categories of force and fraud.
Those who believe in a New Progressivism think that the shared answer—‘forbid
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it’—is much too simple, and in important ways misleading and even damaging, both
to rights and to the economy. I am speaking here, then, of a promising but often
overlooked means for promoting a range of social goals.
New Progressivists do believe that incentives are important, and for anyone
who believes that, it seems natural to think that if conduct is banned, there will be less
of it. But bans create problems of their own. In some circumstances they can be selfdefeating, producing more of the behaviour that they seek to reduce. The reason is
that behaviour is often driven by social norms, and hence by the signal that the
behaviour carries; a ban can amplify the signal and increase the conduct. Suppose, for
example, that people are engaging in certain harmful conduct precisely because the
conduct is a way of defying authority and offering certain signals to relevant people.
You might smoke, for example, precisely because smoking is, in some places, a
dissident act; so too with a decision to engage in unsafe sex; so too for a decision to
commit a crime. In short, actions have meanings, and the social meaning of action is
an important determinant of what people will do and when they will do it. (In the
United States, some increases in risky sex have come from deliberate efforts at
defying efforts to convince people to use condoms.)
Many people will engage in conduct that they do not otherwise enjoy or value,
because of the social meaning of engaging in it; many people will fail to engage in
activity that they would enjoy or value, for exactly the same reason. If the social
meaning of harm-avoiding activity is cowardice or capitulation, people are likely to
refuse harm-avoiding activity. If the social meaning of harm-producing activity is
boldness and independence, people are more likely to impose harms. In these
circumstances any governmental effort to ‘forbid’ certain conduct might be futile or
even counterproductive. If what is driving behaviour is its social meaning, the effect
of a ban could be to increase it, by increasing the strength of the signal that is the
motivation after all. Compare the finding that when people are paid to engage in
certain desirable activity (cleaning up, for example, or arriving on time to pick up
children from school), they will sometimes actually engage in that behaviour less
rather than more, because the payment reduces the effect of the norm, which would
otherwise have the effect of the payment.

DOING WHAT OTHERS DO
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Those who seek a New Progressivism are especially interested in enlisting an
understanding of social norms and social meanings in the service of improved
policies, involving both rights and growth. They emphasize that in many domains,
people frequently think and do what they think and do because of what they think
(relevant) others think and do. Thus, for example, employees are more likely to file
suit if members of the same workgroup have also done so10; teenage girls who see that
other teenagers are having babies are more likely to become pregnant themselves11;
littering and non-littering behavior appears to be contagious12; the same is true of
violent crime13; those who know other people who are on welfare are more likely to
go on welfare themselves14; the behaviour of proximate others affects the decision
whether to recycle15; a good way to increase the incidence of tax compliance is to
inform people of high levels of voluntary tax compliance16; and students are less
likely to engage in binge drinking if they think that most of their fellow students do
not engage in binge drinking, so much so that disclosure of this fact is one of the few
successful methods of reducing binge drinking on university campuses in the United
States.17
Social influences affect behaviour via two different mechanisms. The first is
informational. If many other people support a particular candidate, or refuse to use
drugs, or carry guns, observers, and particularly observers within a common group,
are given a signal about what it makes sense to do. The second mechanism is
reputational, as group members impose sanctions on perceived deviants, and would-
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See Marianne Bertrand, Erzo F.P. Luttmer and Sendhil Millainathan, Network Effects and Welfare
Cultures (unpublished manuscript, April 9, 1998).
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Peers’, in Designing Alcohol and Other Drug Prevention Programs in Higher Education (US
Department of Education ed., 1997) 177-206; Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Availability
Cascades and Risk Regulation’, (1999) 51 Stanford Law Review 683, 767. A good outline of contagion
effects can be found in Gardner, Kleinman and Butler, n. 9 above, at 91-4.
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be deviants anticipate the sanctions in advance.18 Even when people do not believe
that what other people do provides information about what actually should be done,
they may think that the actions of others provide information about what other people
think should be done. People care about their reputations, and hence they have an
incentive to do what (they think) other group members think they should do.
Reputational considerations may, for example, lead people to obey or not to obey the
law, urge a certain view in group discussions, drive while drunk, help others, or talk
about political issues in a certain way.
The central question is how an understanding of these points might lead
policies in better directions. What is especially promising is the possibility of
achieving a ‘tipping point’, in which large numbers of people end up moving in novel
directions.19 People typically have different ‘thresholds’ for choosing to believe or do
something new or different. As those with low thresholds come to a certain belief or
action, people with somewhat higher thresholds join them, possibly to a point where a
critical mass is reached, making groups, possibly even nations ‘tip’.20 The result of
this process can be to produce snowball or cascade effects, as small or even large
groups of people end up believing something—even if that something is false—
simply because other people seem to believe that it is true. Real world phenomena
also seem to have a great deal to do with cascade effects.21 Consider, for example,
smoking, participating in protests, striking, recycling, using birth control, rioting,
choosing what to put on television,22 even leaving bad dinner parties.23 We can
understand certain people, in the private and public sectors, as ‘norm entrepreneurs’,
seeking to give certain signals to many people, and in the process helping to shift
norms in a desirable direction.
With respect to policy tools, of special note is the availability heuristic: people
tend to think that an event is more likely if an incident of its occurrence can readily be
18
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Granovetter, n. 19 above, at 1422-24,
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brought to mind. It is for this reason that a single, highly publicized event can have
important behavioual consequences, as when disclosure that a famous athlete or actor
is HIV-positive can make thousands or even millions of people change their behavior.
The single incident makes the risk seem both higher and more salient. It can even
change the meaning of action. ‘Availability entrepreneurs’ can draw public attention
to individual persons and cases, with the self-conscious goal of producing ‘availability
cascades’, with which perceptions, by millions of people, can simultaneously shift. In
the United States, this has happened with fear of abandoned hazardous waste dumps
and nuclear power, as well as HIV/AIDS; Thailand used the strategy successfully in
the later context.24
There is a closely related phenomenon: group polarization. It has been shown
that any group of like-minded people, after deliberating with one another, tends to end
up believing a more extreme version of what they thought before they spoke together.
Consider some examples of the basic phenomenon, known as group polarization,
which has been found in over a dozen nations.25

(a) A group of moderately

profeminist women will become more strongly profeminist after discussion.26 (b)
After discussion, citizens of France become more critical of the United States and its
intentions with respect to economic aid.27 (c) After discussion, whites predisposed to
show racial prejudice offer more negative responses to the question whether white
racism is responsible for conditions faced by African-Americans in American cities.28
(d) After discussion, whites predisposed not to show racial prejudice offer more
positive responses to the same question.29
As statistical regularities, it should follow, for example, that those moderately
critical of an ongoing war effort will, after discussion, sharply oppose the war; that
those who believe that global warming is a serious problem are likely, after
24

See Kuran and Sunstein, n. 16 above.
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possible that some cultures would show a greater or lesser tendency toward polarization; this would be
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(1976) 20 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 286.
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discussion, to hold that belief with considerable confidence; that people tending to
believe in the inferiority of a certain racial group will become more entrenched in this
belief as a result of discussion. For present purposes, group polarization is important
because it shows how groups tend to move. If some members of a group can be
convinced to shift their position, the group’s middle will shift as well, and quite large
changes can be anticipated.
All this is quite abstract. The central question remains: How might
government, seeking to promote its goals at low cost, induce tipping, or social
cascades?

EDUCATION AND INFORMATION

Suppose that people are engaging in activity that involves harm to self or to others; for
simplicity, assume that the activity is not itself criminal. From the standpoint of the
New Progressivism, hoping not to intrude on rights and to respect democratic ideals,
the first prescription is simple: Inform people. With respect to cigarette smoking and
unsafe sex, for example, a great deal of risky behaviour comes simply from a lack of
information. Evidence shows that by itself, information, if it can be made salient and
vivid, produces substantial changes in behaviour. In Thailand, a revelation that 44 per
cent of sex workers in Chiang Mai were infected with HIV appears to have
contributed to a substantial increase in the use of condoms. Growth in condom use in
the United States in the 1980s was driven largely by information. Public information
campaigns, use of the mass media, and face-to-face education and training
programmes are all able to help.30
This should hardly be surprising. But there is a somewhat more subtle point. It
is possible to produce information-induced norm cascades, in which social norms, and
social meanings, change dramatically as a result of changes in beliefs. In the United
States, this has happened with large-scale shifts in judgments about cigarette smoking
and, in the early 1990s, with large-scale shifts in judgments about both sexual

30
See World Bank, Efficient and Effective Strategies for Preventing HIV/HIV/AIDS, available at
www.worldbank.org/HIV/AIDS-econ/confront/confrontfull/chapter3/chap3.html.
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harassment and risky sex. One of the causes and consequences of these shifts has been
a change in the relevant social meaning. Consider smoking: Whereas smokers were
once thought to be doing something entirely normal, so that objecting nonsmokers
were prissy intermeddlers, now smokers are thought to be doing something aggressive
and possibly injurious, so that they are expected to apologize and to ask permission.
The same has happened in many domains for sexual harassment and risky sex. What
once seemed normal and even bold now seems abnormal and objectionable. A key
question is whether dissemination of more information about harm-producing activity
can produce large-scale changes in behavior. Often it seems to do precisely that.
COSTS AND NORMS

Of course information is unlikely to do enough. People who engage in risky behaviour
sometimes know that their behaviour is risky. People who fail to recycle, or who
otherwise create environmental harm, often know what they are doing. People who
engage in discrimination often mistake no facts. New Progressivists seek, in such
circumstances, to produce initiatives that will increase the benefits or decrease the
(pecuniary or non-pecuniary) costs of desirable behaviour, and decrease the benefits
or increase the (pecuniary or non-pecuniary) costs of undesirable behaviour. Efforts to
change norms might play a role in these efforts.
In the context of risk-creating behaviour, it is often easy to think of methods in
this vein. People might, for example, be required to wear seatbelts, or to use helmets
when riding motorcycles. Such programmes impose sanctions on violators.
Sometimes subsidies are better than sanctions. In the context of the HIV/AIDS crisis,
condom-marketing programmes have often been demonstrably successful. Such
programmes involve public subsidization of condoms, and also make condoms easily
available by selling them at a wide range of places. Part of the goal of such
programmes is to ‘show condom use as normal, healthy, and even fun’.31 Especially
when targeted at high-risk areas and poor households, such programmes have been
exceedingly beneficial, producing significant increases in condom sales and use—in
Thailand, for example, a 90 per cent level of condom use in commercial sex.
Some aggressive action would involve efforts to alter the social meaning of
risk-producing activity, partly through creative private-public partnerships. In many
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places in the world, use of a condom is an accusation or a confession. But in others,
the failure to use a condom reflects a kind of irresponsibility, a willingness to risk the
life of another person. The most promising policies make condom use appear routine
and responsible, and hardly an act of cowardice, or a violation of the goals of the
underlying activity.
There is a particularly important point here: Norms are most easily changed
when the relevant population is young. With respect to HIV/AIDS, environmental
harm, and crime, many members of the target group are in the process of developing
their own norms. To the extent that government can work with that population,
helping to create norms that produce benefit rather than harm, there is much to be
gained. For HIV/AIDS in particular, an absolutely central goal in this regard should
be to ensure equality on the basis of gender with respect to sexual relations—an idea
that calls for prohibitions, through law and norms, on sexual coercion of all kinds,
principally via rape, but through other forms of force as well. ‘No’ should be
understood to mean ‘no’; ‘only with a condom’ should be understood to mean exactly
that. In fact a democracy is especially well situated to make progress here, because
under good conditions, there is no sharp separation between the citizenry and the
government.

CRIME: ORDER MAINTENANCE AND CONTAGION

Crimes are violations of people’s rights. But why do people commit crimes? No
simple answer would make sense. Undoubtedly poverty and desperation are much of
the answer, But part of the answer also lies in people’s perceptions of what other
people do. With respect to crime, people often do not know what, exactly, they should
do, and what they do depends crucially on what they see other people doing.
Criminality, and law-abiding behavior, appear to be contagious.
If most people think that many people are engaging in crime, crime will
increase. If most people think that few people are criminals, criminal activity will be
less likely. The bad news is that all societies are vulnerable to ‘crime cascades’, as
people take their cues from others. The good news is that this fact can be enlisted in
the service of crime prevention. In both the United States and England, efforts have
31
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been made, with considerable success, to use order maintenance and community
policing in the interest of ‘legality cascades’. In various contexts, an understanding of
group polarization can help explain the underlying social dynamics.
In the 1990s, for example, New York saw a dramatic decrease in crime—not
merely in murder (40 per cent), but also in burglary (over 25 per cent) and robbery
(over 30 per cent). A significant contributing factor stems from the ‘fixing broken
windows’ approach to crime prevention. The basic idea is that both law-abiding
citizens and potential law-breakers learn a great deal from the presence of order or
disorder; people who obey the law are less likely to use the streets in the presence of
disorder, and prospective criminals are more likely to engage in criminal activity,
taking disorder as a signal about what is possible. But if minor problems—such as
begging, graffiti, prostitution, loitering, littering, and broken windows are sharply
reduced—the signals will be very different, and more serious crimes will decline too.
On this view, efforts to stop or reverse a crime epidemic at the very start, through
seemingly small changes in context, can have large beneficial consequences.
This is the core of the ‘order maintenance’ approach to crime. In 1993, New
York started to attempt to maintain social order and to give new signals to prospective
criminals—by focusing on seemingly small criminal actions, such as aggressive
begging, public drunkenness, prostitution, and vandalism. In the view of some
observers, the lesson of New York’s successful attack on crime is that a crime
epidemic can be reversed by altering relatively small details of the immediate
environment. Whether or not this experience can be replicated in other nations in this
precise form, the general lesson remains. Prospective criminals, and prospective
victims, act on the basis of their perceptions of what other people are going to do.
When people think that crime is increasing, cascade effects are possible, as
prospective victims refuse to use common areas, which become dominated by
criminals, and people unsure whether to be criminals, taking their signals from others,
often choose the socially undesirable course. Happily, the opposite can happen when
people are given signals that crime is decreasing. Policy initiatives that alter signals
on this count can make a great deal of difference.
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NO PANACEAS, BUT CLUES

There are no panaceas in the ideas outlined here. The most basic suggestion is that
individuals act in accordance with prevailing norms, and hence it is possible to induce
large behavioural shifts. Social cascades are common, and they are often produced by
the availability heuristic, acting in combination with social influences and group
polarization. With respect to harm-producing conduct, these phenomena hold out a
great deal of hope. The best approach is to be simultaneously experimental and
optimistic. Initiatives should be monitored, and if one initiative fails, another might
succeed—an evident conclusion of the most successful participants in Dorner’s
experiments.

Employment and Poverty: Supplementing, Not Displacing, Markets

In this section I turn from social norms to issues of deprivation and poverty. I do so
principally by comparing three ways of responding to deprivation in the employment
market, deprivation that usually produces poverty, through joblessness or low wages.
These ways are associated respectively with markets, planning, and the New
Progressivism. My general suggestion is that a New Progressivist government should
generally refuse to block exchanges between contracting parties. It should respond
instead by providing economic help directly to those who need help. These ‘market
supplementing’ approaches are to be preferred to ‘market displacing’ approaches
characteristic of the way of planning. Market supplementing approaches do not
intrude on liberty or rights; they are less likely to reduce economic growth; they are
also more likely to be successful.
Those who favour the way of markets tend to respond to poverty either with
nothing or with a social safety net, and not a very generous one at that. For many
people, these weak responses amount to a rights violation. Those who favour the way
of planning respond with high minimum wages, aggressive regulation of the labour
market and the housing market, and a generous social safety net. Those who endorse
the New Progressivism reject both approaches. They place the highest premium on
three strategies: (1) education and training; (2) taxpayer-supported wage and housing
subsidies; and (3) incentives to companies to increase the likelihood that they will
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locate in poor areas and hire people who would otherwise lack work (‘empowerment
zones’ and ‘enterprise zones’). Above all, they believe that no citizen should be poor
if she is willing and able to work, that everyone should be able to work, and that in
the absence of special circumstances (disability, obligations to others), almost
everyone should be willing to work. This is the sense in which New Progressivists
endorse the Third Way idea that there should be ‘no rights without responsibilities’.

BLOCKED EXCHANGES AS MESS

Well-motivated planners often try to protect people by ‘blocking exchanges’, through,
for example, minimal rights that employees, consumers, and tenants must enjoy, and
may not waive, even through voluntary agreements. In the market, and particularly in
the labour market, a common justification for this form of regulation is redistribution,
in particular redistribution to those who need help. Strategies of this kind are often
thought to protect basic rights.
National legislatures often impose controls on the market to prevent what it
sees as exploitation or unfair dealing by employers, who seem to have a competitive
advantage over workers, especially poor workers.

Those who favour a New

Progressivism sympathize with the goals here, but they believe that this approach
suffers from many of the problems faced by Dorner’s planners. New Progressivists
thus have a presumption against this approach, because they do not believe that it is,
in general, a good way to help people who need help. The presumption is certainly
rebuttable; sometimes blocked exchanges can do some good. But New Progressivists
generally seek to help workers through other means—through, for example, earned
income tax credits, income supplements, subsidized housing, and education and
training.
To be sure, many agreements between employers and employees seem and are
harsh, and the claim for redistribution is often a powerful one as a matter of basic
principle. Workers often enter into unjust deals, simply because their options are so
few. In fact market wages and prices depend on a wide range of factors that are
morally irrelevant: historical injustice; supply and demand curves at any particular
point; variations in family structure and opportunities for education and employment;
existing tastes; and perhaps even differences in initial endowments, including talents,
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intelligence, or physical strength. If the regulation could be made effective and does
not produce high ancillary costs (an important qualification), government should not
always take these factors as ‘natural’, or let them be turned into social disadvantages.
The inspiration for minimum wage legislation, for example, is easy to identify. So too,
rent control legislation prevents tenants from being subject to unanticipated price
increases and perhaps thrown into significantly inferior housing; and implied
warranties of habitability protect tenants from living in disgraceful and indeed
dangerous apartments.
In all these cases, however, regulation may well be a poor mechanism for
redistributing resources, precisely because it is often self-defeating. The problem is
that if everything else is held constant, the market will frequently adjust to the
imposition of regulation in a way that will harm many people, including the least
well-off. This is not a claim that markets have any moral status; it is a claim that
blocking exchanges is often a doomed way of doing what well-motivated planners are
seeking to do, that is, to help poor people.
Hence, for example, it is a mistake—we might even call it the defining
mistake of planners—to assume that regulation will directly transfer resources or
create only after-the-fact winners and losers (an idea exemplified by the assumption
that the only effect of the minimum wage is to raise wages for those currently
working, or that the only effect of protecting tenants against eviction is to allow poor
tenants to retain housing). In ordinary circumstances, an important consequence of a
high minimum wage is to increase unemployment by raising the price of marginal
labour. Those at the bottom of the ladder—the most vulnerable members of society—
are the victims. In a rich nation with a growing economy and a low unemployment
rate, a high minimum wage law might not do much harm, and might well do enough
good to be justified on balance. But in a country that is not rich, and that has a high
unemployment rate, there is reason to be doubtful of high minimum wage
requirements, simply because they impair economic development, and further do not
redistribute resources from employers to poor workers (which would be good), but
end up hurting the poorest people of all, who are less likely to be able to obtain jobs.
In fact—and this is a separate problem with blocking exchanges as a method
of redistribution—a minimum wage is not directly targeted at poor people at all. In
many nations, those who benefit from the minimum wage have other sources of
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income. In the United States, for example, an increase in the minimum wage goes
largely to middle-income (39.5 per cent) and upper-income (34.7 per cent) citizens,
and only about 25 per cent goes to the poor (13.1 per cent) and near-poor (12.7 per
cent).32 Of course minimum wage workers are usually far from wealthy. But the
problem with regulations blocking exchanges is that they are not specifically targeted
at the poor. They help those who do not need help, or who do not have the strongest
claim to help, and thus waste resources that might be better used elsewhere.
In the same vein, rent control legislation and implied warranties of habitability
create incentives for producers (landlords) to leave the housing market, and
disincentives for people to enter that market. This has perverse redistributive
consequences and especially harsh results for the poor, who may be left without
housing at all. It should be obvious that the beneficiaries of rent control legislation
need not be poor and often are not poor. In the United States, it should not be
surprising to find that Cambridge, Massachusetts has experienced a dramatic growth
in new housing since rent control was eliminated by state referendum.
I have said that blocking exchanges is not always a bad idea. Minimum wage
legislation does, after all, raise the wages of the working poor, and in some
circumstances—especially but not only those of sustained economic growth—the
disemployment effects will be small or nonexistent. But there can be little doubt that
interference with the labour market will produce losers as well as winners. Efforts to
redistribute resources through regulation can therefore have serious perverse results.33
The point bears on regulation of the labour market, the housing market, and the
market for ordinary goods and services. It counsels against anything that looks like
‘price fixing’ as a redistributive strategy.
32
See Daniel Shaviro, ‘The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Optimal Subsidy
Policy’, (1997) 64 University of Chicago Law Review 405, 435.
33
Two qualifications are necessary here. First, the redistributive regulation, though in some ways
perverse, might be part of a system of redistribution that is effective overall. A minimum wage law
might be justified as a means of protecting the working poor if it is accompanied by a welfare system to
take care of those who cannot work at all. For this reason, plausible arguments can be made for the
minimum wage. The only point is that if it is too costly to employers, substantial disemployment
effects are inevitable.
The second qualification is that some laws that seem to be justified on redistributive grounds
are best understood as a response to inadequate information. Occupational safety and health legislation
does not transfer resources from employers to employees; but it may be justified as a response to the
fact that workers lack information about workplace risks. In the face of inadequate information, a
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should be to try to inform people.
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ALTERNATIVES

Thus far I have been discussing what the New Progressivism opposes. What does it
support instead? The answer is not reliance on markets alone. New Progressivists
firmly believe that simple and even effective redistribution, such as cash grants to the
poor from taxpayer funds, are justified in principle. They believe in a social safety
net; in this way they accept the South African approach, which understands the
category of rights to include gross deprivation of basic needs. But they do not believe
that planners offer promising responses to poverty, unemployment, and general
deprivation. Instead New Progressivists emphasize approaches that will give people
an ability to help themselves, through education, training, and job opportunities,
fuelled by economic incentives in the form (for example) of tax credits to employers
and employees alike. They seek to supplement rather than to displace markets.
In case there was any doubt, a recent study of South Africa, based on 1996
data, shows the enormous importance of education to employment prospects.34 The
study shows that high ratios of teachers to students dramatically increase the
likelihood of employment—with a statistically significant effect for males, and a very
large effect for females. The authors conclude that the apartheid ‘system continues to
profoundly influence the life chances of many Black Africans, through its long lasting
effects on the country’s education system. Many Black Africans currently in the labor
force attended schools with inadequately trained teachers, insufficient textbooks, and
pupil-teacher ratios above 80 children per class.’ The result of all this is to decrease
both years in school and employment prospects. Better education and training is the
most direct and effective way of helping people to obtain jobs and decent wages.
For many people, of course, other steps are required. A central New
Progressivist approach is to develop systems to supplement low wages. A key here is
to generate a strategy that will neither (a) discourage employers from hiring people
nor (b) discourage prospective workers from seeking employment. Many countries
have experimented with some variation on the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).
Under this approach, working people (the programme may or may not be limited to
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people with children) who earn low wages obtain a tax credit from the government,
sufficient to raise their total compensation to a decent level. The tax credit is phased
out once workers receive money above a certain level. In the United States, for
example, someone who earns an income of about $10,000 will receive about $3800 at
tax time; a mother and father who earn $25,000 will receive about $1200 at tax time.
In the United States alone, the EITC has been a terrific success, lifting millions of
people from poverty. In 1996 alone, the effect of the EITC was to take 4.6 million
people, including 2.4 million children, out of poverty.35
Compared to planning-type initiatives, there are three large advantages to the
EITC approach. The first is that unlike the minimum wage, it does not make labour
more costly for employers, and thus does not decrease employers’ desire to hire
people. The second is that it increases people’s incentives to work, by making work
more remunerative. The third is that unlike the minimum wage, the EITC is genuinely
and specifically targeted at people who are poor. In the United States, for example,
nearly three-quarters of those who benefit from the EITC are poor or near-poor.36 The
EITC is the model of a New Progressivism antipoverty programme.
Creative policymakers could easily build on this model—and use it as an
alternative to well-motivated but crude plans. Planners interested in protecting tenants
might, for example, impose ceilings on rent increases. Those interested in protecting
those dependent on certain important commodities might impose price ceilings. If the
government is interested in ensuring that tenants cannot be evicted for nonpayment of
rent, it might impose large procedural hurdles to eviction. If decent housing is
unavailable, government might build housing on its own. These strategies are all
associated with planning, and they might do some good. But New Progressivists
would look for alternatives. They might seek, for example, to provide housing
vouchers to poor people, or to provide food stamps to those who are unable to buy
enough to eat.
More generally, New Progressivists would urge government to build
‘empowerment zones’ or ‘enterprise zones’ in poor communities, by giving
34
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businesses a tax credit, or direct subsidies, to the extent that they are willing to locate
in areas that need help, and to employ people who need jobs. These are marketoriented strategies that do not make a fetish of market ordering. They deploy markets
in the interest of human goals. Learning from the failures and half-successes of
planning, those who use such strategies attempt to be like the successful participants
in Dorner’s experiments, whose interventions are alert to the potentially harmful sideeffects of intrusions into systems.

Command and Control Regulation: A Presumption Against

In controlling pollution and other social harms, a number of states, including some of
the most proudly capitalist, have engaged in a modest form of ‘planning’, through
command-and-control regulation. Such regulation involves centralized regulatory
requirements imposed on dozens, hundreds, thousands, or even millions of producers.
As examples, consider air pollution control requirements, imposed on new cars and
trucks; ‘best available technology’ (BAT) requirements, imposed on polluting firms;
and specified levels of mandatory pollution reductions, imposed on companies of
various kinds. Similar approaches can be found in the area of occupational safety,
where national authorities sometimes specify the safety technologies and approaches
that must be used by all or most firms.
It is important to acknowledge that in many states, command-and-control
regulation has accomplished significant good. Planning of this form has hardly been a
complete failure. In the United States, it has helped produce dramatic reductions in
levels of air and water pollution. Reliance on markets alone would have been far
worse. In this domain, the way of planning is far better than the way of markets. But
for several reasons, the New Progressivism rejects the basic approach. They are
concerned that command-and-control approaches will compromise economic
development and also undermine democracy.
The first problem is that it is usually unnecessarily expensive, even wasteful
for government to prescribe the means for achieving social objectives. At least as a
general rule, it is especially inefficient for government to dictate technology. One of
the many problems with BAT strategies, for example, is that they ignore the enormous
differences among plants and industries and among geographical areas. It is not
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sensible to impose the same technology on industries in diverse areas—regardless of
whether they are polluted or clean, populated or empty, or expensive or cheap to clean
up. BAT strategies also require all new industries to adopt costly technology, and
allow more lenient standards to be imposed on existing plants and industries. Through
this route BAT strategies actually penalize new products, thus discouraging
investment and perpetuating old, dirty technology. The result is inefficiency in
investment strategies, in innovation, and even in environmental protection. Such
strategies also fail to encourage new pollution control technology and indeed serve to
discourage it by requiring its adoption for no financial gain. In general, governmental
specification of the ‘means’ of achieving desired ends is a good way of producing
unnecessarily high costs. Instead of permitting industry and consumers to choose the
‘means’—and thus to impose a form of market discipline on that question—
government often selects the means in advance. The governmentally-prescribed
means are often the most inefficient.
More fundamentally, command-and-control approaches are severely deficient
from the standpoint of democracy. The focus on the question of ‘means’ tends to
increase the power of well-organized private groups, by allowing them to press
environmental and regulatory law in the service of their own parochial ends. The BAT
approach, for example, ensures that citizens and representatives will be focusing their
attention not on what levels of reduction are appropriate, but instead on the largely
incidental and nearly impenetrable question of what technologies are now available.
Because of its sheer complexity, this issue is not easily subject to democratic
resolution. Moreover, the issue is not the relevant one for democratic politics, which
is the appropriate degree and nature of environmental protection—an issue to which
the BAT question is only incidental.
The approach favoured by the New Progressivism is much simpler: (1) begin
by informing people about risks, including environmental risks, and (2) where this is
inadequate, impose a tax on harmful behaviour, and let market forces determine the
response to the increased cost. Thus governments might adopt a simple, two-step
reform policy in the area of social risks and social harms. First, those who impose
harm must pay for it—by purchasing permission to do so, perhaps through a licensing
procedure. Second, those who obtain the resulting permission should be able to trade
their ‘licenses’ with other people. In the pollution context, this would mean that
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people who reduce their pollution below a specified level could trade their ‘pollution
rights’ for cash. In one stroke, such a system would create market-based disincentives
to pollute and market-based incentives for pollution control. Such a system would also
reward rather than punish technological innovation in pollution control, and do so
with the aid of private markets. An idea of this kind might be made part and parcel of
a system of ‘green taxes’. With such a system, nations might impose taxes on people
who impose harms on others—users of dirty automobiles, farmers who employ
pesticides, coal-fired power plants, gasoline that produces air pollution, products that
contribute to destruction of the ozone layer or the greenhouse effect.
Economic incentives could be applied in other areas as well. Workers'
compensation plans, for example, operate as effective guarantees of workplace safety.
According to a careful study, ‘[i]f the safety incentives of workers' compensation
were removed, fatality rates in the United States economy would increase by almost
30 percent. Over 1200 more workers would die from job injuries every year in the
absence of the safety incentives provided by workers' compensation.’37 This contrasts
with a mere 2-4 per cent reduction in injuries from the Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA), an amount that links up well with the fact that annual workers'
compensation premiums are more than 1000 times as large as total annual OSHA
penalties. The tax system could be used to provide better incentives to employers who
furnish dangerous workplaces. The consumer product safety commission might
experiment with a system in which producers of harm-producing products must pay a
fee into the federal treasury. Ultimately, we might hope for a coordinated system of
risk regulation, one that imposed specified fees for harm-producing activities.
For democracy, such an approach would have significant consequences, and
these consequences would be extremely beneficial. The large question—how much
environmental protection at what cost—does not easily permit legislators to favor a
well-organized, narrow group, such as the agricultural lobby, or the coal lobby.
Special favours cannot readily be provided through a system of economic incentives.
The very generality of the question will work against narrow favouritism.
The international movement toward economic incentives, a central part of the
New Progressivism, is preliminary but real. Thus far, it has occurred mostly in the
environmental area. An important series of administrative initiatives have brought
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about ‘emissions trading’, especially under the American Clean Air Act.38 Under the
Environmental Protection Agency’s policy, a firm that reduces its emissions below
legal requirements may obtain ‘credits’ that can be used against higher emissions
elsewhere. Overall, the programme has produced savings of between $525 million and
$12 billion.39 By any measure, this is an enormous gain. On balance, moreover, the
environmental consequences have been beneficial. Offsets must, by definition,
produce environmental gains. The preliminary evidence shows favourable effects
from bubbles as well. There may be modest beneficial effects from banking and
modest adverse effects from netting. The overall environmental effect is therefore
good, cost entirely to one side.
As part of the process for eliminating lead from gasoline—a decision that was,
not incidentally, strongly supported by a cost-benefit study—the EPA also permitted
emissions trading. Under this policy, a refinery that produced gasoline with lower
than required lead levels could earn credits. These could be traded with other
refineries or banked for future use. Until the termination of the programme in 1987,
when the phase-down of lead ended, emissions credits for lead were widely traded.
EPA concluded that there had been cost savings of about 20 per cent over alternative
systems, marking total savings in the hundreds of million of dollars. There have been
similar efforts with water pollution and ozone depletion.40
Perhaps the most dramatic programme of economic incentives can be found in
the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act. The Act now explicitly creates an
emissions trading system for the control of acid deposition. In these amendments,
Congress has made an explicit decision about aggregate emission levels for a
pollutant. Whether the particular decision is the correct one may be disputed. But
surely there are large democratic benefits from ensuring that public attention is
focused on that issue. There are palpable economic benefits as well. The system for
controlling acid deposition is billions of dollars less expensive than the commandand-control alternatives.
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The idea can be adapted to many domains. Consider, for example, the African
Elephant Conservation Act, which created a two-prong strategy to combat species
loss. These included cooperative conservation projects and strict import controls for
countries with endangered elephant populations. The United States would not import
from any such country; but once a nation was able to stabilize its elephant population
and to receive a new listing, it would be permitted to engage in the trade of ivory. In a
way this policy might seem worse than a flat ban on ivory trade. But in practice, it has
worked far better, because it creates an incentive to have sizeable herds. In many
cases, elephants were ‘owned’ and protected by the relevant communities, increasing
efforts to quash poaching in the knowledge that they would be economically better off
if they were able to be listed as having stabilized their elephant population. The Act
has been extremely successful, and served as the model for the subsequent Rhinoceros
and Tiger Act and the Asian Elephant Act. Nations interested in preserving their own
environmental goods, including endangered species, might well build on this idea.

Economic Growth, Capabilities, and Sex Equality

GROWTH AND ITS LIMITS

Thus far I have dealt with New Progressivist means—stressing the need to attend to
both incentives and norms, and to avoid the crudeness associated with many plans. It
is now time to turn to the question of ends. That question cannot be answered without
saying something about the relationship between economic growth, social welfare,
and individual rights.
For the last decades, many people have evaluated national well-being in terms
of economic growth alone. Indeed, this approach has been characteristic of those who
emphasize the way of markets; and much of the time, it has been adopted by those
who attempt the way of planning as well. On this view, a nation’s performance is
assessed by asking about Gross Domestic Product, and by seeing its movement over
time.
Certainly GDP is a useful figure, for it bears a relationship to important social
goals. If we think of income as an all-purpose means—as something that people want
regardless of what else they want—we might well attend to GDP. Though its

33

importance is merely instrumental, growth does matter for a wide range of important
goals. Thus a recent study of anti-poverty measures in the United States, by someone
well-disposed to government programmes and unenthusiastic about the way of
markets, announces as Lesson 1, ‘A strong macroeconomy matters more than
anything else.’41 Well-protected property rights and freedom of contract, protected by
state institutions, are quite central to economic growth.42 They are at least as
important in poor countries as in rich ones.
There are, however, a number of problems with relying on GDP as a measure
of well-being.
The most obvious problem involves distributional considerations. If income is
unequally distributed, a high GDP may disguise the fact that many people are living
bad or even desperate lives. For example, the United States has the highest per capita
real GDP in the world. But it also has a higher rate of children living in poverty—
about one in five—than does any other wealthy country in the world. The rate of
children living in poverty is double that of the industrialized nations taken as a whole
and four times that of Western Europe. Nearly half of all black children in the United
States live in poverty. While white Americans, if taken separately, would rank first
on the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index,
African-Americans, if taken separately, would rank somewhere in the thirties. These
crucial economic facts are undisclosed by GDP. And if deprivation is seen as a rights
violation, economic growth can conceal substantial rights violations.
GDP sometimes seems to be a general placeholder for a number of diverse
indicators of social and economic well-being. But in fact, it may not be closely
correlated with some important indicators. Consider two major social goals: reduction
of poverty and reduction of unemployment. Of course GDP growth can be an
important factor in counteracting both unemployment and poverty. But it is also
possible for GDP increases to be accompanied by increases in unemployment and
hence poverty (which is closely correlated with unemployment); indeed, this
phenomenon has often occurred. Or consider the likelihood of subjection to violent
crime. Physical security is surely an important ingredient in well-being, but it is at
best indirectly reflected in GDP. Consider also the fact that there is no inevitable
41
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connection between GDP and life expectancy. Some countries have a relatively low
GDP but long life expectancy and low rates of infant mortality. Many countries have
a high GDP but do poorly in promoting longevity. Education is an important part of a
good life, whether or not educated people accumulate wealth; but the association
between education and GDP, while real, is extremely crude.
GDP also fails to account for goods and services that are free, including some
that are closely connected with economic well-being. For example, unpaid domestic
labour is not a part of GDP. Many environmental amenities, such as clean air and
water, are not reflected in GDP. The GDP figure thus fails adequately to measure
either the benefits of a healthy environment or the costs of its degradation. There are
other gaps in what GDP measures. It does not, for example, reflect changes in leisure
time; but it is clear that any increase in leisure is a gain even in economic terms, since
leisure is something for which people are willing to pay, sometimes a great deal. Most
generally, a serious problem with GDP is that the figure excludes all social costs and
benefits that do not have prices.
The most general point is that GDP does not adequately capture what a good
society is concerned to ensure. Responding to these points, many people have
attempted to come up with other measures of national well-being. Of these the
UNDP’s effort is the best known. The UNDP uses an index of well-being based on
per capita income, educational attainment, and longevity. In 1999, South Africa was
ranked 101 on the list, below China, Turkey, Georgia, and Albania. Some of the key
numbers include a life expectancy at birth of 54.7 years, an adult literacy rate of 84
per cent, and real GDP per capita of $7,380. The most striking number here is the low
life expectancy number—below, for example, that of Bangladesh, Nepal, India, and
Pakistan.
Of course any ‘index’ is bound to have a degree of arbitrariness. What is
important is that a nation with a low GDP can also give its citizens long lives and a
good education—and that a nation with a high GDP can give its citizens a poor
education and relatively low life expectancies. (On the latter point, the United States
is an unfortunate case, with an extremely high per capita income but one of the lowest
life expectancies among comparable countries.) The theoretical roots of these efforts
to go beyond GDP lie in the ‘capabilities approach’, which attempts to assess ‘what
42

See Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity (1999).

35

people are actually able to do and to be’.43 (We can view the capabilities approach as
an effort, within both economics and philosophy, to give some concrete detail to the
aspects of human rights and ‘basic needs’.)
The central idea, rooted in a notion of human dignity, is that a nation should
ensure not ‘satisfaction of preferences’, and not a certain level of resources, but
instead an ability to choose what kind of life to have. Of course preferences and
beliefs may well adapt to existing deprivation—a common phenomenon, and one that
creates serious problems for the way of markets insofar as that way makes
‘preferences’ determinative of social policy. Nor should it be contentious to urge that
certain capabilities are necessary to a decent human life. These include the ability to
live a decently long life, to have good health, to participate in political choices that
affect one’s life, to be educated, to hold property.44 When people lack one or more of
these abilities, they suffer from ‘capability failure’, and this is the problem to which
government should respond. The minimal responsibility of a New Progressivist
government is to ensure that all citizens are able to come above a certain threshold.
The less minimal obligation is to ensure that all citizens have more than minimal
capabilities on all of these dimensions.
This general idea cannot without arbitrariness be turned into a formula or
index. But insofar as the Human Development Index, and related efforts, go beyond
GDP to provide a simple, salient, easily understood figure by which to facilitate
international comparisons and changes over time, they are a good place to start. They
also provide a great deal of help with priority-setting. In the United States, Finland,
Botswana and South Africa, for example, it is clear that a large premium should be
placed on improving longevity; the citizens of these nations can expect relatively
short lives, undoubtedly in part as a result of high levels of crime and low levels of
health care. By contrast, Sweden, New Zealand, Cuba and Georgia should concentrate
on increasing economic growth; all of these nations provide decent education, and
relatively long lives, but keep their citizens relatively poor.

The Anticaste Principle—and the Centrality of Sex Equality
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CASTE AND ANTICASTE

The capabilities approach gives a sense of the New Progressivist account of liberty;
but it says little about equality. For New Progressivists, I have suggested it is
important to ensure that everyone has decent life prospects, and also that everyone
comes over a ‘capability threshold’. But a separate and equally central equality goal is
the attack on any situation in which some people, defined in terms of a morally
irrelevant characteristic, are treated as second-class citizens, or turned into members
of a lower caste. Thus an anticaste principle, undergirding a constitutional equality
norm, plays a large role in New Progressivist thinking.
The anticaste principle is not a thoroughly egalitarian goal. It is compatible
with large disparities in wealth and resources. But it insists that morally irrelevant
characteristics, such as race, religion, and gender, should not be turned into a basis for
second-class citizenship. Thus New Progressivists see one of the most serious
inequality problems of the twentieth century in the pervasive practice of seizing on a
characteristic lacking moral relevance, and using it as the basis for the systematic
subordination of members of certain social groups. This conception of equality is
opposed to several others, including the ‘formal equality’ principle, which does not
focus attention on systematic subordination, and indeed which sees efforts to
counteract such subordination as a form of discrimination. Commitment to the
anticaste principle hardly exhausts the domain of rights. But it is an important
component of a rights-respecting society.

SEX EQUALITY AS A CENTRAL GOAL, AS A MEANS AND AN END

For developing and wealthy countries alike, an end to sexual hierarchy is an
especially high priority—as both a means and an end. With respect to many
problems—HIV/AIDS, crime, economic growth and overpopulation—there are few
higher priorities. Indeed any generalized attack on poverty must be combined with an
attack on sexual hierarchy. The two are closely intermingled problems.
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Note first that sex equality is an important means to human development, as
Amartya Sen and others have shown, with their particular emphasis on ‘women’s
agency’.45 A nation in which girls and women have a chance to do and to be what
they want to do and to be is much likelier to develop and to develop well. A nation
with sexual hierarchy is far more likely to suffer economically and in other ways. In
fact a system of equality on the basis of sex is likely to redress many problems not
normally thought to be associated with it, such as overpopulation and the individual
and social drains that come from unwanted children. When women have a range of
opportunities, and when their choices are not a product of deprivation, these problems
are sharply diminished. If women are able to decide whether to have children,
unwanted children are less likely, and children who are unwanted are far more likely
to suffer and to make society suffer in response, sometimes through criminal
behaviour. If women have agency, many crimes will be reduced as a result,
emphatically including sex crimes. If women have agency, the economy will do
better, simply because there will be more people willing and able to do good work. If
women have agency, there will be an immediate and substantial reduction in the
AIDS crisis, simply because women will be able to engage in sexual relations only
when they want, and on the terms that they choose. This is a potentially enormous
benefit for men and women alike, and for adults and children alike as well.
This idea has many implications. It means that education and training for girls
are crucial. It also means that by both law and norms, girls and women should be
allowed to decide when and whether to become mothers—which means, among other
things, that sexual relations should always be a choice, not a requirement. Here there
is an evident link to the earlier discussion of norms and norm cascades, and a
particular link to the problems of crime and HIV/AIDS. In fact a social policy directed
against sexual subordination in multiple spheres is highly likely to combat both
problems.

Conclusion

I have attempted in this essay to clarify the relationships among rights, democracy,
and economic growth, endorsing in the process a New Progressivism. Of course it is
45
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possible to conceive of rights, and of democracy, in a way that leads to great tension
with economic growth. But we can also understand democracy in deliberative terms,
in a way that reduces the tension with both rights and growth. We can also understand
rights in a way that makes economic growth their alley rather than their adversary.
Rights in general depend on a certain degree of economy development, simply
because rights cost money. And if rights include freedom from desperate conditions,
economic growth is extremely important.
But it is not sufficient. Markets must be supplemented by additional efforts,
supported by a democratic society. Too much of the time, markets do little to help
people who face circumstances of deprivation. From the standpoint of freedom and
justice, they are nothing to celebrate. From the standpoint of economics, this was the
great lesson of the first half of the twentieth century. We have seen that markets are
emphatically human products, not natural but conventional, created by law and to be
evaluated in terms of their consequences. The question is what they do to and for the
people who are subject to them.
At the same time, economic planning, in its many diverse forms, is often futile
and counterproductive, partly because of the difficulty of foreseeing the systemic
effects of one-shot interventions. In its various guises, planning often invites interest
group manoeuvering, thus damaging democracy, and produces unintended harmful
consequences, notwithstanding the good intentions of many planners. This has been
the great lesson of the second half of the twentieth century.
In these circumstances, any New Progressivism, to be worthy of use, should
not be understood as a compromise measure, or as steering ‘between’ two poles. It is
insistently and unapologetically committed to a certain understanding of the goals
associated with social democracy in Europe and the New Deal in the United States.
These do not include egalitarianism, understood as equal or roughly equal economic
outcomes. But they do include decent life prospects for all, a social safety net in the
form of adequate floors, political equality, and an anticaste principle, in the form of
opposition to second-class citizenship for members of any social group. Attempting to
understand social democratic goals in a coherent way, those who believe in a New
Progressivism insist on a self-conscious effort to promote the fundamental capabilities
of all citizens, by ensuring that everyone falls above a certain generous threshold.
Those who endorse a New Progressivism therefore reject the idea that markets should
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be identified with liberty at the same time that they seek to go beyond the sometimes
sloppy and diffuse set of goals associated with the way of planning. Those who
endorse a New Progressivism also put the highest premium on the achievement of an
end to sexual hierarchy.
With respect to means, New Progressivists seek a government that acts as
catalyst; the basic goal is to create incentives that will move behaviour in desirable
directions. New Progressivists see much planning as analogous to the hapless
participants in Dietrich Dorner’s experiments—as ill-conceived interventions into
systems that confound the goals of the interveners. To avoid the problem of ‘mess’,
New Progressivism programmes are based on a presumption against blocked
exchanges and command-and-control regulation. There is an effort to complement
rather than to displace markets. Antipoverty programmes take the form of incentives
to work, designed to ensure that everyone who works is able to live decently, that
everyone has a chance to work, and that those who choose not to work have a good
reason for not doing so. Regulatory programmes are based on a presumption in favour
of informing people and providing economic incentives for desirable conduct.
Finally, New Progressivists insist on the importance of civil society and above
all of the norms that often drive behaviour. Alert to the possibility of social cascades,
those who seek a New Progressivism insist on the provision of information, and also
on seemingly small steps that can, under favorable conditions, have large effects on
behaviour.
There is no policy blueprint here. Of courlicy on a more secure sense of gose
no country is exactly like any other. No one can design a set of policy initiatives that
will work well, or at all, in every nation on the globe. But the problems with the way
of markets and the way of planning are pervasive. In many nations, an alternative that
attempts to promote human capabilities, in a way that is alert to the nature of
incentives and the role of social norms, promises to draw on both of the great lessons
of the twentieth century, and to build povernment’s appropriate ends, and of the
means that are most likely to promote those ends.
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